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Transitivity Performance, Relational Hierarchy Knowledge and
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ABSTRACT: The transitive inference (TI) paradigm has been widely used
to examine the role of the hippocampus in generalization. Here we con-
sider a surprising feature of experimental findings in this task: the relatively
poor transitivity performance and levels of hierarchy knowledge achieved
by adult human subjects. We focused on the influence of the task instruc-
tions on participants’ subsequent performance—a single-word framing
manipulation which either specified the relation between items as transi-
tive (i.e., OLD-FRAME: choose which item is “older”) or left it ambiguous
(i.e., NO-FRAME: choose which item is “correct”). We show a marked but
highly specific effect of manipulating prior knowledge through instruction:
transitivity performance and levels of relational hierarchy knowledge were
enhanced, but premise performance unchanged. Further, we show that
hierarchy recall accuracy, but not conventional awareness scores, was a
significant predictor of inferential performance across the entire group of
participants. The current study has four main implications: first, our find-
ings establish the importance of the task instructions, and prior knowledge,
in the TI paradigm—suggesting that they influence the size of the overall
hypothesis space (e.g., to favor a linear hierarchical structure over other
possibilities in the OLD-FRAME). Second, the dissociable effects of the
instructional frame on premise and inference performance provide evi-
dence for the operation of distinct underlying mechanisms (i.e., an associa-
tive mechanism vs. relational hierarchy knowledge). Third, our findings
suggest that a detailed measurement of hierarchy recall accuracy may be a
more sensitive index of relational hierarchy knowledge, than conventional
awareness score—and should be used in future studies investigating links
between awareness and inferential performance. Finally, our study moti-
vates an experimental setting that ensures robust hierarchy learning across
participants—therefore facilitating study of the neural mechanisms under-
lying the learning and representation of linear hierarchies. VC 2013 The
Authors. Hippocampus Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
KEY WORDS: hippocampus; transitive inference; generalization; rela-
tional memory
INTRODUCTION
The transitive inference (TI) paradigm has been extensively used across
species to investigate the cognitive mechanisms supporting generalization—
a term we use here to describe the flexible expression of
prior learning in novel situations (e.g., new associative
combinations of familiar stimuli), through the exploita-
tion of structure present within a set of related episodes
(e.g., Kumaran, 2012; Kumaran and McClelland, 2012;
Zeithamova and Zeithamova et al. 2012)—and the spe-
cific contribution of the hippocampus (Bryant and Tra-
basso, 1971; McGonigle and Chalmers, 1977; Rapp
et al., 1996; Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997; Delius and
Siemann, 1998; Greene et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2003,
2005; Heckers et al., 2004; Titone et al., 2004; Smith
and Squire, 2005; Moses et al., 2006, b; Kumaran
et al., 2012; Zeithamova et al., 2012). Indeed, recent
work has highlighted the theoretical significance of an
important role for the hippocampus in generalization,
which offers a substantial challenge to prevailing compu-
tational accounts of this neural structure as an episodic
memory device which by its nature tends to emphasize
the distinct features of events, at the expense of their
commonalities (e.g., Kumaran, 2012; Kumaran and
McClelland, 2012; Zeithamova et al).
Two puzzling questions remain, however; first, it has
not been clear why the ability of adult human subjects
to perform transitivity judgments in contemporary ver-
sions of the paradigm tends to be highly variable across
participants and between studies (e.g., 60% in Frank
et al., 2005 vs. 90% in Greene et al. 2001), and
often relatively poor. Indeed, the variable performance
of adult subjects stands in contrast to an early study
which reported high levels of transitivity performance
(80–90%) in young children of 4–6 yrs of age (Bry-
ant and Trabasso, 1971). Second, and related to the
issue of variable transitivity performance, is the ques-
tion of why only a minority of subjects typically
develop relational (or declarative) knowledge of the
hierarchy, as indexed by the accuracy with which par-
ticipants are able to recall the order of items in hierar-
chy (e.g., Smith and Squire, 2005)—e.g., 8 out of 65
participants in the experiment by Frank et al., 2005.
Here we investigate why subjects tend to show rela-
tively poor transitivity performance and often fail to
develop hierarchy knowledge, in versions of the TI
paradigm that could be considered the standard in the
contemporary literature (Greene et al., 2001; Heckers
et al., 2004; Frank et al., 2005; Smith and Squire,
2005; Moses et al., 2006; Ellenbogen et al., 2007;
Moses et al., 2010b; Zeithamova et al., 2012). In par-
ticular, we focused our attention on the potential
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influence of the task instructions received by participants. Our
hypothesis was that the strikingly proficient levels of transitivity
performance (i.e., >80%) shown by the very young subjects
(i.e., 4–6 yrs old) in the original paradigm used by Bryant and
Trabasso (1971) could in part have related to the inherently
transitive nature of the relation between items in that setting
(i.e., selecting the “longer” of a pair of rods—where actual rod
length was hidden from view). Accordingly, our intuition was
that the relatively poor and variable levels of transitivity per-
formance exhibited by participants in the “standard” version of
the paradigm (reviewed in Zeithamova et al., 2012) might be
accounted for by instructions that leave the nature of the rela-
tion ambiguous (i.e., “choose which item is correct”). As such,
participants in recent TI experiments may equally well have
assumed on the basis of training trial experiences that the rela-
tionship between items is contextual (i.e., choose A in the pres-
ence of AB, but B in the presence of BC; see Greene et al.,
2006<AQ2> for a related argument), rather than transitive in
nature—and consequently performed relatively poorly as a
group during transitivity trials (e.g., B-D).
To test the hypothesis that task instructions are an important
factor in influencing participants’ subsequent level of transitiv-
ity performance and hierarchy knowledge, we conducted a
between-subjects experiment. Participants in each experimental
group were treated identically, with the exception of the initial
task instructions received, which differed by one critical
word—as such the relation between items was either left
ambiguous, or specified to be transitive in nature (see Meth-
ods). In contrast, previous studies either assessed the effect of
manipulating the overall instructions received by participants
(Greene et al., 2001), or providing prior experience with a
semantically meaningful hierarchy composed of playing cards
(i.e., 9–10-J-Q-K-A: Moses et al., 2010a)—rather than specifi-
cally focusing on the way in which item relations are specified
(see Discussion).
Participants in the NO-FRAME group were instructed to
choose the stimulus, depicting a galaxy, which they thought
was “correct” during training trials, and test trials. As such,
the instructions received by participants in the NO-FRAME
group were designed to be analogous to those used in what
we refer to as the standard TI paradigm (reviewed in Zeitha-
mova et al., 2012). In contrast, participants in the OLD-
FRAME group were instructed to choose the stimulus (i.e.,
galaxy) they thought was “older” during training and test tri-
als—following the “classical” version of the TI paradigm
developed by Bryant and Trabasso (Bryant and Trabasso,
1971). Our hypothesis was that participants in the OLD-
FRAME group would show significantly better inference per-
formance, through having the relation being items defined
(cf., left ambiguous—in the NO-FRAME group) at the point
of instruction. Further, we aimed to show, through a direct
test of the accuracy of hierarchy recall, that this inferential
performance was underpinned by relational knowledge
(Eichenbaum, 2004; Smith and Squire, 2005) of the hierarchy
(cf., other mechanisms: see Moses et al. 2006 and Zeithamova
et al., 2012, for review).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty healthy individuals participated in this experiment
(age range 18–35; 14 female). All participants gave informed
written consent to participation in accordance with the local
research ethics committee. Each group (NO-FRAME, OLD-
FRAME) comprised 15 participants. There was no significant
differences between subject groups in terms of age, years of
higher education, or performance on an abbreviated form (i.e.,
subset) of the Raven’s progressive matrices (all Ps >0.1).
Participants in each experimental group were treated identi-
cally, with the exception of the initial task instructions received,
which differed through one critical word. Participants in the
NO-FRAME group were instructed to choose the galaxy they
thought was “correct” during training trials and test trials. In
contrast, participants in the OLD-FRAME group were instructed
to choose the galaxy they thought was “older” during training
and test trials.
Stimuli
Pictures of galaxies were obtained from various sites on the
Internet (including http://hubblesite.org/gallery/album/nebula).
The galaxy hierarchy consisted of eight items (i.e., A-B-C-D-E-
F-G-H, where A is the highest ranking item and H the lowest
ranking; see Appendix for example stimuli, though color stim-
uli were used in the experiment). The allocation of individual
pictures to position in the hierarchy was randomized across the
group of participants. Stimuli were presented using Cogent
Graphics toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_graphics.
php) operating in a MATLAB 7 environment.
Experimental Design
During a training trial, adjacent items in the hierarchy were
presented on either side of the screen (i.e., seven premise pairs:
e.g., A vs. B, B vs. C, C vs. D, D vs. E, E vs. F, F vs. G, G vs.
H). The left-right position of an item on the screen was
randomized across trials. Participants had 5 seconds in which
to choose, via button press (i.e., left or right, index or middle
finger of right hand, respectively), the item which they thought
was “correct” (NO-FRAME condition) or “older” (OLD-
FRAME condition). After participant’s response, a feedback
screen appeared: this consisted of a green square border that
indicated the participant’s choice together with either “120
points” or “220 points”, for a correct or incorrect response,
respectively. A fixation cross preceded the onset of the next
trial.
Test trials involved the presentation of the seven premise
pairs as well as nine inference pairs (i.e., pairs of nonadjacent
items in the hierarchy: B vs. D, B vs. E, B vs. F, C vs. E, C vs.
F, C vs. G, D vs. F, D vs. G, E vs. G). As in training trials,
participants had 5 seconds in which to choose, via button press
(i.e., left or right), the galaxy which they thought was “correct”
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(NO-FRAME condition) or was “older” (OLD-FRAME condi-
tion). Importantly, feedback was not presented during test tri-
als, although participants were instructed that their choices
would still count toward their final payout. Instead, after par-
ticipant’s response, a screen appeared that required participants
to rate (on a scale of 1–3) their confidence in their decision:
participants were carefully instructed to enter a “1” response if
they were guessing entirely, a “2” response if they “had some
idea but were not sure” about their choice, and to reserve a
“3” response until they were “more than 90% certain” that
their choice was the correct one. Participants were told that
although their confidence responses would not count toward
their final payout, they should still answer as accurately as pos-
sible. Note that although subjective confidence responses were
recorded in this experiment, here we restrict our analyses to the
binary choice data.
The remuneration received by participants was determined
directly from the number of correct responses during training
and test trials, in addition to a basic minimum for participa-
tion in the experiment.
Participants completed two experimental sessions (with a
1-minute break in between), comprising six blocks each. Each
block consisted of a miniblock of training trials followed by a
miniblock of test trials. Each training trial miniblock consisted
of 21 trials in total made up from three repetitions of each of
the seven premise pair types (e.g., A vs. B: see above) presented
in pseudorandom order. Each test trial miniblock consisted of
16 trials in total made up from one repetition of each of the
seven premise pairs (e.g., A vs. B), and one repetition of each
of the nine inference pairs (e.g., B vs. D), presented in pseu-
dorandom order. The start of each miniblock was preceded
with the relevant instruction (i.e., “Get ready for Training tri-
als”, “Get ready for Test trials”). Following the end of each
miniblock, a screen showing the percentage of correct responses
achieved was displayed.
Debriefing Protocol and Scoring of Hierarchy
Recall Test
Following the completion of the experiment, participants
were carefully debriefed so as to evaluate the presence and
nature of explicit knowledge concerning the task structure. A
debriefing questionnaire (total score5 12; see Appendix) that
was based closely on that employed by Moses et al. (2006)
(also see Greene et al., 2001) was administered to participants
to assess their explicit awareness of the task structure (i.e.,
including awareness that item relations were transitive). This
questionnaire included among other questions, a hierarchy
recall test in which participants were asked to explicitly recon-
struct the order of items in the hierarchy.
Participants’ performance on the hierarchy recall test was
scored in two ways: (1) on a two-point scale, as in Moses
et al., 2006<AQ2>, which counted toward the 12-point
awareness score; (2) using a scoring procedure that penalizes
incorrect positioning of an item according to its deviation from
the item’s true position. Specifically, the summed deviation of a
participant’s stated position of each item from its true position
(e.g., if the top ranked item was placed in sixth position, this
would be scored as a deviation of 5) was calculated.
Behavioral Analyses
Behavioral analyses were conducted using SPSS version 19
using standard procedures. The analyses presented here focus
on the binary choice data obtained during training and test tri-
als: the test trial confidence data are not considered for the
present purposes. Performance accuracy and reaction time were
analyzed for both training blocks and test blocks, using
repeated measures mixed factor analyses of variance (ANOVA).
Mauchly’s test was used to evaluate whether the assumption of
sphericity had been violated, and degrees of freedom were cor-
rected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity when
appropriate.
RESULTS
Performance on Training Trials
We first considered the performance (% correct and reaction
time (RT)) of both groups of participants over the 12 blocks
of training trials. During the last block of training trials, the
NO-FRAME group averaged 90.2% correct responses (SD
16.3), and the OLD-FRAME group averaged 92.4% correct
responses (SD 9.0)(see Fig. 1A). Data were analyzed using a
mixed-design ANOVA with one within-subject factor of block
(12 levels) and one between-subject factor (group: NO-
FRAME, OLD-FRAME). In terms of % correct responses,
main effect of block (F(3.9, 108.8)5 56.0, P< 0.001) was sig-
nificant, with a significant linear effect (F(1, 28)5 118.7,
P< 0.001). Main effect of group and interaction of block and
group were not significant (P> 0.2). For RT: main effect of
block (F(4.1, 115.5)5 7.18, P< 0.001) was significant, with a
significant linear effect (F(1, 28)518.2, P< 0.001). Main
effect of group and interaction of block and group were not
significant (P> 0.2).
We next considered the performance of participants on
training trials, as a function of premise pair (see Fig. 1B). Data
were collapsed across all training trial blocks and analyzed
using a mixed-design ANOVA with one within subject factor
of premise pair type (seven levels: A vs. B, B vs. C. . ., G vs.
H), and one between-subject factor of group (NO-FRAME,
OLD-FRAME). For % correct responses: main effect of pre-
mise pair type (F(6, 168)5 20.7, P< 0.001) was significant,
with a significant quadratic effect (F(1, 28)5 116.3,
P< 0.001). Main effect of group and interaction of premise
pair type and group were not significant (P> 0.2). For RT: we
observed a main effect of premise pair type (F(4.2,
117.9)5 56.8, P< 0.001). No effect of group, or group by
premise pair interaction was observed (P> 0.2).
As a follow-up test, we explored the main effect of premise
pair type further in a mixed-design ANOVA where premise
pairs were grouped into outer pairs (A vs. B, B vs. C, F vs.
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G, and G vs. H) and inner pairs (C vs,D, D vs. E, E vs. F): a
main effect of pair type was found (F(1, 28)5 61.9,
P< 0.001) reflecting superior performance on trials involving
outer pairs. Indeed, performance on outer pairs was signifi-
cantly better than on inner pairs when the outermost premise
pairs were excluded from this analysis (i.e., outer pairs con-
sisted only of B vs. C, F vs. G: F(1,28)5 64.5, P< 0.001).
For RT: a main effect of pair type was also found (F(1,
28)5 81.1, P< 0.001) reflecting shorter reaction times on tri-
als involving outer pairs.
We further observed that performance (% correct) was supe-
rior during GH trials, as compared to AB trials as evidenced
by the results of a mixed-design ANOVA (factors: premise pair
type, group: (F(1, 28)5 9.4 P< 0.01)) and a paired-sample t-
test (GH>AB: t(29)5 3.1, two-tailed test P< 0.01). Reaction
times were also significantly faster during GH trials, as com-
pared to AB trials: t(29)5 2.1, two-tailed test P< 0.05).
These results demonstrate that participants improved their
performance across training trial blocks, in terms of % correct
responses and speeded reaction times, with no difference
observed between NO-FRAME and OLD-FRAME groups.
Further, the profile of performance observed (e.g., superior per-
formance in outer premise pairs vs. inner pairs) was similar in
both subject groups, and consistent with the operation of asso-
ciative learning mechanisms (Delius and Siemann, 1998; Frank
et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2005; Moses et al., 2006; Zeithamova
et al., 2012).
Performance on Test Trials
Although confidence responses were also obtained in this
experiment, here we focus our analysis on the binary choice
data (see Methods). The average performance of participants in
the NO-FRAME group on premise pairs and inference pairs
across all test trial blocks was 81.1% (SD 10.5) and 62.6%
(SD 14.4), respectively. The average performance of partici-
pants in the OLD-FRAME group on premise pairs and infer-
ence pairs was 82.5% (SD 5.9) and 76.7% (SD 10.1),
respectively (see Fig. 2A,B). During the last test trial block
(i.e., block 12), the average performance of participants in the
NO-FRAME group on premise pairs and inference pairs was
92.4% (SD 15.3) and 73.3% (SD 26.8), respectively. The per-
formance of participants in the OLD-FRAME group on pre-
mise pairs and inference pairs during the last test trial block
was 94.3% (SD 18.6) and 97.8% (SD 8.6), respectively (see
Fig. 2C).
Data were analyzed using a mixed-design ANOVA with two
within-subject factors of trial type (premise, inference) and block,
and one between-subject factor (group: NO-FRAME, OLD-
FRAME). For % correct responses: main effects of trial type
(F(1, 28)5 29.2, P< 0.001), block (F(5.1, 143.8)5 29.8,
P< 0.001), and group (F(1, 28)5 6.0, P< 0.05) were signifi-
cant. There were significant interactions between trial type and
group (F(1, 28)5 7.9, P< 0.01), and trial type and block
(F(6.0, 169.1)5 2.3, P< 0.05). A borderline significant result
was observed for the interaction between block and group
(F(5.1, 143.8)5 2.2, P5 0.06). For RT: main effects of trial
type (F(1, 28)5 38.3, P< 0.001), block (F(5.0, 139.4)5 17.8,
P< 0.001), and block by group interaction (F(5.0, 139.4)5 2.6,
P< 0.05) were significant. The main effect of group was not sig-
nificant (P> 0.1). A follow-up paired sample t-test showed that
premise pair RT was significantly faster (mean 1.8 seconds, SD
0.3) than inference pair RT (mean 2.0 seconds, SD 0.3:
t(29)5 5.7, P< 0.001).
A further ANOVA confirmed that the significant main effect
of group (% correct responses), and interaction between group
and trial type, was driven by superior performance of the OLD-
FRAME group compared to the NO-FRAME group on inference
pairs. Specifically, an ANOVA focusing on inference pair perform-
ance (i.e., factors: block, group) revealed a significant main effect
of group (F(1, 28)5 9.6, P< 0.01), as well as a main effect of
block (F(5.4, 149.8)5 14.5, P< 0.001). Of note there was also a
significant block 3 group interaction (F(5.4, 149.8)5 2.6,
P< 0.05). This was shown in a follow-up ANOVA to be due to
significantly superior inference pair performance in the OLD-
FRAME group (cf., NO-FRAME) in the second half of the
experiment (main effect of group: F(1, 28)5 14.4, P< 0.001),
but not in the first half (P> 0.2). In contrast, an ANOVA focus-
ing on premise pair performance (i.e., factors: block, group)
revealed no significant main effect of group or block by group
interaction (both Ps> 0.2), although a significant main effect of
block was present (F(5.7, 160.6)5 24.1, P< 0.001).
We next examined how performance on inference pairs var-
ied as a function of the distance between the position of items
FIGURE 1. Performance during training trials. (A) Perform-
ance on training trials across the 12 blocks of the experiment. (B)
Performance as a function of premise pair type, averaged across all
experimental blocks. NO-FRAME group shown in light gray, and
OLD-FRAME group shown in dark grey. Error bars denote SEM.
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on the hierarchy (i.e., symbolic distance; e.g., equal to 2 for a
B vs. D trial; see Fig. 2D). Relating to % correct responses: an
ANOVA with factors distance (2, 3, 4) and group showed a
significant main effect of distance: F(2, 27) 515.9, P< 0.001)
as well as a significant main effect of group (F(1, 28)5 7.6,
P< 0.01). Although there was a borderline significant distance
3 group interaction: F(2, 27)5 3.1, P5 0.06), we found a
main effect of distance when each subject group was analyzed
separately: NO-FRAME ((F(2, 28)5 11.6, P< 0.001) and
OLD-FRAME ((F(2, 28)5 4.7, P< 0.05)), with both effects
linear in nature (both Ps <0.01). No significant effects were
seen in relation to RT, either in terms of a main effect of dis-
tance or a distance by group interaction (both Ps >0.1).
Follow-up one-way ANOVAs revealed that these results were
driven by a superior performance (% correct responses) of the
OLD-FRAME group (cf., NO-FRAME) in distance 2 (e.g., B
vs. D) and distance 3 (e.g., B vs. E) inference pairs: F(1,
28)5 14.9, P< 0.001 and F(1, 28)5 7.8, P5 0.01, respec-
tively. In contrast, no difference was found between perform-
ance of the two groups in distance 4 inference pairs: P> 0.2
(see Fig. 2D).
Awareness Scores and Hierarchy Recall
Accuracy
The average of the NO-FRAME group on the “awareness”
post-experimental questionnaire test (maximum score
achievable5 12 points) was 6.9 (SD 2.1)—that of the OLD-
FRAME group was 9.5 (SD 2.7). These scores were signifi-
cantly different: one-way ANOVA F(1, 28)5 8.3, P< 0.01.
Considering participants performance on the hierarchy recall
test specifically: 5 out of 15 participants in the NO-FRAME
were able to perfectly recall the hierarchy, as compared to 11
out of 15 participants in the OLD-FRAME group: these values
were significantly different from each other (Pearson’s chi-
squared: P< 0.05). The average number of errors made on the
hierarchy recall test (see Methods for details of calculation of
deviation of participant’s reconstructed hierarchy from actual
hierarchy) for the NO-FRAME and OLD-FRAME groups
were 7.6 (SD 8.1) and 2.7 (SD 5.6), respectively (see Fig. 3A).
There was a borderline significant effect of group on the num-
ber of hierarchy recall errors made: F(1, 28)5 3.8, P5 0.06.
We next asked whether participants’ score on the awareness
questionnaire, and their ability to accurately recall the hierarchy
order, correlated with their performance on inference pairs dur-
ing test trials. When both groups were considered together,
there was a significant correlation between performance on
inference test pairs (i.e., averaged across all 12 blocks) and
number of hierarchy recall errors (r520.67, P< 0.001)—and
also with awareness score (r5 0.46, P< 0.05). Considering
each group separately, in the NO-FRAME group, there was a
significant correlation between inferential performance (aver-
aged across all pair types in the entire experiment) and the
accuracy of hierarchy recall (r5 0.63, P< 0.01), but not
awareness score (r5 0.0, P> 0.2). Note that the correlation of
hierarchy recall accuracy with inferential performance was also
significant when only the last block of test trials was considered
FIGURE 2. Performance during test trials. (A) Performance on
test trials involving premise pairs (e.g., A vs. B) across the 12
blocks of the experiment. (B) Performance on test trials involving
inference pairs (e.g., B vs. D) across the 12 blocks of the experi-
ment. (C) Performance on test trials (i.e., premise and inference
pairs) during the last block. (D) Performance on test trials as a
function of symbolic distance (i.e., premise pair5 1, B vs. D infer-
ence pair5 2 etc.) NO-FRAME group shown in light gray, and
OLD-FRAME group shown in dark grey in all plots. Error bars
denote SEM.
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(r5 0.80, P< 0.001)—as before, no correlation with awareness
score was observed (P> 0.1). In the OLD-FRAME group,
both debriefing measures showed a significant correlation with
inferential performance (awareness score r5 0.64 P< 0.01,
hierarchy recall accuracy r5 0.58, P< 0.05).
Finally, we performed a multiple regression analysis where the
relationship between inferential performance (i.e., averaged across
blocks) and the two debriefing measures (i.e., awareness score,
number of hierarchy recall errors) was assessed, across the whole
group of 30 participants. We found a significant overall effect
(ANOVA: F(2, 27)5 11.1, P< 0.001) that was related to a sig-
nificant effect of hierarchy recall errors (beta520.64, P< 0.001:
see Fig. 3B) but not awareness score (beta5 0.04, P> 0.8). A
similar result was also observed when inferential performance was
restricted to the last test trial block (ANOVA: F(2, 27)5 23.6,
P< 0.001): with a significant effect of hierarchy recall errors
(beta520.78, P< 0.001) but not awareness score (beta5 0.03,
P> 0.8). Taken together, these results suggest that high levels of
relational hierarchy knowledge, but not high levels of awareness,
were predictive of successful inferential performance.
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we examined the influence on perform-
ance in the TI paradigm of manipulating prior knowledge at
the point of instruction—through the change of a critical word
from one that specified the relation between items as transitive
(“older”) to one that left it ambiguous (“correct”). We report
three key findings: first, our instructional manipulation had a
highly specific effect on inferential performance, whilst leaving
premise pair performance entirely unaffected. Secondly, we
show that the OLD-FRAME ensured the development of robust
relational hierarchy knowledge across the subject group—to a
degree that was significantly greater than that achieved by the
NO-FRAME group. Finally, we show that hierarchy recall accu-
racy, but not awareness scores, was a significant predictor of
inferential performance across the entire group of participants—
suggesting that this measure may be a more sensitive index of
relational hierarchy knowledge. Taken together, our findings pro-
vide insights into the relatively poor performance of participants
in contemporary TI experiments, motivate a version of the TI
paradigm that ensures robust hierarchy learning, and highlight
the critical importance of distinguishing between measures of
hierarchy knowledge, and more general measures of awareness.
It is important to consider our experimental paradigm and
findings in relation to two previous studies which share similar
aims. We first summarize their principal findings: in the study
by Greene et al. (2001), participants who were given explicit
instructions revealing the task structure—concerning the transi-
tivity of the item relation, the number of items in the hierar-
chy, and the structure of premise pair presentation (i.e.,
FIGURE 3. Performance on hierarchy recall test. (A) Average
number of recall errors for each subject group. Error bars denote
SEM. Note chance performance (calculated by monte carlo simula-
tion) is 20.5 (SD 5) (B) 3D Scatterplot with regression line fitted,
and two views illustrated: Lefthand plot shows absence of a signifi-
cant influence of awareness score on inference performance on test
trials (i.e., averaged across 12 blocks). Righthand plot shows sig-
nificant linear correlation between number of hierarchy recall
errors made by a given subject, and their performance on infer-
ence test trials (i.e., averaged across all 12 blocks).
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involving adjacent items in hierarchy) (see the Appendix of this
paper for details)—performed more successfully on premise
pairs and inference pairs, as compared to (“uninformed”) par-
ticipants who were merely instructed to choose the “correct”
item. The study by Moses et al. (2010a) observed a significant
effect on both premise and inference pair performance using a
very different form of between-subjects manipulation involving
training: here, participants that had previously been exposed to
and solved a TI task involving a semantically familiar hierarchy
(i.e., a playing card hierarchy: 9–10-J-Q-K-A) performed better
in a subsequent experimental session involving a hierarchy
composed of abstract shapes, as compared to participants who
had experienced only abstract stimuli during training.
Our findings, therefore, converge with previous work in
demonstrating that the relatively poor performance of healthy
young participants on contemporary versions of the TI task
can be markedly improved through manipulating the amount
of prior knowledge—either through instruction (Greene et al.,
2001) or through previous training (Moses et al., 2010a; also
see Kumaran, in press). A key difference between our study
and previous work, however, is the selectivity of the between-
subjects manipulation: in our experiment the two participant
groups were treated equivalently, with the exception of a single
word change at instruction (i.e., “correct” or “older”). In con-
trast, the two participants groups in these previous studies dif-
fered in several respects; i.e., not only in terms of information
received concerning the nature of item relation (as in our
study) but also in terms of their knowledge of other aspects of
the task (e.g., number of items in the hierarchy, premise pair
schedule, analogical equivalence with a hierarchy of playing
cards). Importantly, therefore, our findings establish that merely
manipulating prior knowledge of the nature of the item rela-
tion has a marked influence on transitivity behavior, whereas
previous studies leave open the question of whether it is appli-
cation of a semantically familiar schema (Moses et al., 2010),
or knowledge of other aspects of the underlying task structure
(Greene et al., 2001) that is critical. Indeed, a recent study
provides evidence that these other kinds of information—e.g.,
knowledge of the structure of premise pair presentation
acquired through training—may also facilitate new hierarchy
learning (Kumaran, In Press).
The current findings—in identifying a critical source of
information (i.e., item relation definition) that facilitates per-
formance in the TI task—point toward a potential mechanism
that may mediate the effects of instruction on transitivity per-
formance. Specifically, instructing participants to choose the
“older” item likely increased the prior over a linear hierarchical
structure—a structural form intimately related to the concept
of transitivity—in effect narrowing the hypothesis space
through the activation of an “overhypothesis” (e.g., Kemp
et al., 2007; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Along these lines, the
relatively poor performance of participants in recent TI experi-
ments (reviewed in Zeithamova et al., 2012), and the NO-
FRAME condition, may have been due to the relatively uncon-
strained nature of the resulting hypothesis space: participants
may have equally well assumed on the basis of training trial
experiences that the relationship between items was contextual
(i.e., choose A in the presence of AB, but B in the presence of
BC), rather than hierarchical (i.e., transitive) in nature. Indeed,
one could speculate that in ethological settings (Cheney and
Seyfarth, 1990; Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007), primates are only
able to efficiently acquire knowledge about their social hierar-
chy from dyadic interactions (cf., training trials) because the
relationship (i.e., dominance) between the individuals in a
dyadic interaction is inherently specified to be transitive in
nature.
Interestingly, our experimental manipulation was found to
have a specific influence on test trial, but not training trial,
performance—in contrast to the improvement of both training
and test trial performance observed by Greene et al. (2001)
and Moses et al. (2010a). Notably, the performance of both
subject groups in our experiment on premise pairs (i.e., during
training and test trials) was indistinguishable, both in terms of
overall % correct responses and overall RT, and also the profile
of performance observed across different pairs, consistent with
the operation of associative learning mechanisms (i.e., U-shaped:
see Fig. 1B)(e.g., Zeithamova and Zeithamova et al. 2012).
Whilst the important methodological differences between
studies makes it difficult to establish why our experimental
manipulation alone produced a specific effect on transitivity
performance and hierarchy knowledge, one possibility is that
manipulations in these other studies resulted in more general
changes in task strategy and hence more widespread effects on
performance. Regardless of the exact mechanism, the experi-
mental dissociation observed—between premise pair perform-
ance on the one hand, and transitivity performance and
relational hierarchy knowledge on the other—provides evidence
that relational knowledge of the hierarchy does not necessarily
emerge once memory of the premise pairs reaches a high level,
a possibility that has been left open based on prior work in
humans, which has tended to observe that these two indices of
performance tend to rise and fall in parallel (e.g., Smith and
Squire, 2005; Moses et al., 2006). As such, the current data
point toward dissociable underlying mechanisms (i.e., associa-
tive vs. relational, respectively), with only the latter (i.e., rela-
tional) under the influence of our instructional framing
manipulation—and accords with previous studies showing that
inferential performance, but not premise performance, is dis-
rupted by hippocampal lesions in non-humans (Dusek and
Eichenbaum, 1997; Buckmaster et al., 2004).
It is interesting to consider the neural mechanisms mediating
the enhancement of hierarchy learning by our instructional
framing manipulation. Although future studies are needed to
explore this question, one possibility is that this effect depends
on interactions between the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex
(PFC). Whilst substantial work has focused on the critical role
of the hippocampus (e.g., see for review, Eichenbaum, 2004;
Zeithamova and Zeithamova et al. 2012), the PFC is also
thought to make an important contribution to transitivity
behavior based on lesion evidence (DeVito et al., 2010; Koscik
and Tranel, 2012) and neuroimaging studies in humans (Acuna
et al., 2002; Wendelken and Bunge, 2009; Heckers et al., 2004;
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Kumaran et al., 2012)—although notably different subregions of
PFC (e.g., ventromedial PFC in Kumaran et al., 2012; dorsolat-
eral PFC in Acuna et al., 2002; rostrolateral PFC in Wendelken
and Bunge, 2009) have been highlighted in these studies. More
generally, the PFC is viewed to support successful performance
in “problem solving” tasks—of which the transitive inference
task can be considered one example—through rule learning at
multiple levels of abstraction and relational complexity (e.g.,
Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 2008; Badre et al.,
2010). As such it is tempting to speculate that our instructional
manipulation acts to constrain the hypothesis space through the
shaping of higher-order representations of the overall task struc-
ture in PFC, which ultimately influence the formation of mem-
ory representations of the linear hierarchy in the hippocampus.
It is worth considering how participants’ performance on test
trials varied as a function of the symbolic distance between items
in the hierarchy. Both groups performed significantly better
when transitive inferences involved larger symbolic distances,
showing linearly increasing performance over the range examined
(i.e., 2–4). Interestingly, participants in the OLD-Frame group
performed significantly better than the NO-Frame group at tran-
sitive inferences involving a smaller symbolic distance (i.e., 2 or
3), but there was no significant difference between the groups at
a larger symbolic distance (i.e., 4). Whilst mechanisms based on
both associative learning and hierarchy knowledge are known to
produce symbolic distance effects of this nature (Breslow, 1981;
Delius and Siemann, 1998; Moses et al., 2006; Zeithamova
et al., 2012), our data point to the conclusion that test trial per-
formance in both groups was driven primarily by relational hier-
archy knowledge (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum,
2004; Smith and Squire, 2005) for two reasons: first, associative
mechanisms are typically viewed to make significant contribu-
tions to test trial performance in the case of shorter hierarchies
than used in this experiment (i.e., five or six items, as opposed
to eight) (Frank et al., 2003). Second, we found a significant
correlation in both groups between test trial performance and
participants’ level of hierarchy knowledge, indexed by the hierar-
chy recall test. As such, our data are consistent with the conclu-
sion that test trial performance in the NO-Frame group
reflected the use of hierarchy knowledge, which was sufficient to
mediate comparable levels of performance (cf., the OLD-Frame
group) at large, but not smaller, symbolic distances.
Our study also has implications for a contentious debate sur-
rounding the relationship between the ability to make transitive
inferences during inference trials and measures of “awareness”
(Greene et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2005; Smith and Squire,
2005)—an issue that has wider relevance to the question of
whether the hippocampus contributes not only to “explicit”,
but also “implicit”, memory (e.g., Greene, 2007). A controver-
sial finding from previous studies is that healthy participants
may perform successfully (i.e., above chance levels) on transitiv-
ity test trials, yet not exhibit conscious awareness (i.e., explicit
knowledge) of the underlying hierarchy—measured typically
by questionnaires administered at the point of debriefing
(e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2005). Our findings,
however, suggest that such questionnaires may not be
sufficiently sensitive—a critical consideration in assessing the
validity of awareness tests (Shanks and St John, 1994)—in
detecting the presence of explicit hierarchy knowledge. Specifi-
cally, our findings demonstrate that there was a robust correla-
tion between inferential performance in the NO-Frame group
and our continuous measure of hierarchy recall accuracy—
which can be considered a gold standard for indexing relational
knowledge of the hierarchy (e.g., see Smith and Squire, 2005;
Kumaran et al., 2012)—even when no such correlation was
evident between conventional questionnaire scores. Indeed we
show, in a multiple regression analysis across the whole group
of 30 participants, that high levels of relational hierarchy
knowledge, but not high awareness scores, were strongly pre-
dictive of inferential performance.
Our findings, therefore, suggest the need for caution when
interpreting previous reports that successful transitivity per-
formance is possible in the absence of explicit knowledge of
the underlying hierarchy (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Frank
et al., 2005). Whilst we believe that future studies are needed
to definitively establish whether above-chance levels of infer-
ential performance are possible in the absence of relational
hierarchy knowledge—where this is indexed by a continuous
hierarchy recall measure—we do acknowledge that this may
well be the case. Indeed, under a different experimental con-
ditions (e.g., using other training regimes), it is conceivable
that successful transitive inference performance may be puta-
tively supported by “implicit” relational hierarchy representa-
tions (e.g., Greene, 2007), or alternative associative learning
mechanisms (e.g., Frank et al., 2004), which may be inacces-
sible to conscious awareness—and therefore uncorrelated with
both awareness scores, and performance on a hierarchy recall
test.
Linear hierarchies can be considered a prototypical form
of knowledge structure that have a wide-ranging influence
across cognitive domains (Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008).
For instance, primates have a remarkable aptitude at rank-
ing each other within social hierarchies that are typically
linear, and stable over long periods of time (Cheney and
Seyfarth, 2007). The transitive inference (TI) paradigm
has several attractive properties that lend itself to studying
the mechanisms that support relational knowledge about
hierarchies. For example, a capacity for social transitivity
judgments is viewed to be supported by knowledge about
the social hierarchy (Paz et al., 2004; Cheney and Sey-
farth, 2007). Further, this knowledge is thought to
develop through observation of pairwise interactions
between conspecifics (Paz et al., 2004; Grosenick et al.,
2007), mirroring learning during training trials in a TI
paradigm. However, two important factors have previously
limited the use of the TI paradigm in studying how
knowledge about hierarchies develops and is represented:
first, as discussed above only a minority of subjects
develop hierarchy knowledge in the standard TI paradigm
(reviewed in Zeithamova et al., 2012)—and secondly, that
multiple mechanisms are known to contribute to success-
ful transitive inferences in a typical TI paradigm (Frank
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et al., 2003; Zeithamova et al., 2012). As such, it has
been difficult to specifically target the contribution of
relational knowledge of the hierarchy to transitive infer-
ences, over mechanisms based on retrieval-mediated asso-
ciative linking (Kumaran and McClelland, 2012)and the
use of elemental values (Fersen et al., 1991; Frank et al.,
2003). The present study—by motivating a version of the
TI paradigm that ensures robust hierarchy learning—pro-
vides an experimental setting, which lends itself to further
characterization of the cognitive and neural mechanisms
underlying hierarchy knowledge (see Kumaran et al., 2012
for a recent fMRI study using this approach).
CONCLUSION
Taken together, our study has several implications: first, we
establish the importance of task instructions in determining
performance in the TI paradigm—and show that prior knowl-
edge that item relations are transitive facilitates inference per-
formance and the development of hierarchy knowledge, likely
by constraining the space of possible task solutions. Second,
our findings demonstrate that hierarchy recall accuracy, but not
awareness scores, was a significant predictor of inferential per-
formance across the entire group of participants—suggesting
that this measure may be the more sensitive index of relational
hierarchy knowledge. Finally, our instructional manipulation—
combined with a specific measure of hierarchy recall accu-
racy—motivates an experimental setting which lends itself to
further characterization of the cognitive and neural mechanisms
underlying hierarchy knowledge.
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APPENDIX
Post-experimental “Awareness” Questionnaire (based on
Moses et al., 2006: scoring scheme (total score5 12) in italics
within brackets, and not shown to participants)
1. How did you find the task? What strategies were you using?
(1a) Were all of the pairs in the testing sessions the same as
in the training sessions?
YES (0)
NO (2)
NOT SURE (1)
(1b) Do you think there was a correct answer for the pairs
in the testing condition?
YES (2)
NO (0)
NOT SURE (1)
(1c) If you believe there was a correct answer, explain why.
(A score of 2 was awarded to participants who described that
there was a galaxy hierarchy. A score of 1 was awarded to
participants who described that the relationship between items
was transitive in nature, but did not describe a hierarchy. A
score of 0 was given to other answers.)
2. In the testing sessions (i.e., no-feedback) of the experiment
you were presented with several different pairs of galaxies:
what reason did you have for choosing one as opposed to
the other? (Please tick one and explain why if possible)
a. There is a logically correct choice. (2)
b. One just seemed right but I can’t explain why (1)
c. I guessed: There may be a correct object, but I don’t
know what it is. (1)
d. I made a random choice because there is no correct
choice. (0)
3. What strategy (if any) did you use to learn which galaxy was
correct? (Please tick one)
a. I memorized each galaxy (0)
FIGURE A1. Example galaxy stimuli.
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b. I just watched and eventually got it (1)
c. No strategy (0)
d. I put them into an order/hierarchy (2)
e. Other (scored as for question 1c)
4. Number the galaxies according to how you think they were
ordered. Use the space provided to number each object 1
through 8. (Galaxies were shown in random order: example
shown. For the purposes of the questionnaire scoring, a score of
2 was given for perfect recall of the hierarchy order. A score of
1 was given if the position of 2 items was swapped, and 0 for
more errors.)
5. How confident are you of the order? (1–6) 15guess, 65very
sure. (This measure was not included in the final questionnaire
score).
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